Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
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Jason Thomas was embedded with US forces in Afghanistan implementing counterinsurgency operations between 2009-2010. His role involved working "outside the wire" 24/7, negotiating with senior Taliban commanders to remove fighting aged men from the battlefield. In 2010 a bounty was placed on his head in Ghazni Province. In 2011 he returned to Afghanistan to work with the US Marine Corp in Helmand. |
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For more publications by Jason, CLICK HERE |
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Jason presented to the Rotary Club of Hawthorn about a subject that is troubling and puzzling to us all, and it was a privilege to hear it from an expert who has been involved in the problem up close and personal. Patrols have the strategic objectives of coercing the people to not harbour terrorists, and if the Taliban or al-Qaeda are allowed to become established in their area, to have them understand that they will be subjected to military strikes to remove them. Meanwhile the objective is also to remain fully engaged with Pakistan to reduce that country's support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Jason explained that when the Coalition forces went into Afghanistan, the objectives were to eliminate the Taliban rule of the country and to destroy al-Qaeda, so Afghanistan could no longer be used as a base for training terrorists and for planning and executing terrorist attacks on Western countries. This was achieved in 2001 but then the objectives were side-tracked into nation building, so now the war has dragged on for more than 10 years.
It is a problem that ever-changing strategies are being pursued. There have been 10 Supreme Commanders from the US in that time. All of them keep treating the Taliban and the general populace as homogeneous whereas every district, every valley and every tribe is different. Criminals, warlords and political misfits are being tolerated and corruption is rife at all levels.
Counterinsurgency has been built on a romantic view that has been packaged by intellectual elites. Money is being used as a weapon, which everyone will gladly take. Attempts at nation-building and provision of infrastructure in a land which has neither the expertise nor the will to sustain it is bound to fail. The West has a preoccupation with quick transition, whereas it is dealing with a country that is still in what could be described at the 9th century, and expecting a 21st century democracy to emerge.
Afghanistan is a very violent country. In 2011 an upsurge in killings resulted in the Taliban being responsible for 2,000 civilian deaths. It is imperative that in dealing with the elders, the negotiators must be strong and courageous, as these are values much appreciated in Afghanistan.
The future belongs to the elders in the tribes who will control the provinces. Many areas are isolated and have no communication or connection to tribes in neighbouring valleys and villages. In these places there have been no changes for centuries, nor will there be in the near future.
Despite all the best efforts of the Coalition forces, when they leave the country in 2014, conditions will return to much what they have always been except that there will be some pockets showing change; but far from any change that might create the kind of democracy envisioned in the romantic views of the Western intellectual elite.
Jason is to be congratulated for delivering a very telling and frank review of what has been troubling so many of us, with the casualties still being experienced as the war drags on, and with little evidence of nation-building able to be observed.
Jason explained that when the Coalition forces went into Afghanistan, the objectives were to eliminate the Taliban rule of the country and to destroy al-Qaeda, so Afghanistan could no longer be used as a base for training terrorists and for planning and executing terrorist attacks on Western countries. This was achieved in 2001 but then the objectives were side-tracked into nation building, so now the war has dragged on for more than 10 years.
It is a problem that ever-changing strategies are being pursued. There have been 10 Supreme Commanders from the US in that time. All of them keep treating the Taliban and the general populace as homogeneous whereas every district, every valley and every tribe is different. Criminals, warlords and political misfits are being tolerated and corruption is rife at all levels.
Counterinsurgency has been built on a romantic view that has been packaged by intellectual elites. Money is being used as a weapon, which everyone will gladly take. Attempts at nation-building and provision of infrastructure in a land which has neither the expertise nor the will to sustain it is bound to fail. The West has a preoccupation with quick transition, whereas it is dealing with a country that is still in what could be described at the 9th century, and expecting a 21st century democracy to emerge.
Afghanistan is a very violent country. In 2011 an upsurge in killings resulted in the Taliban being responsible for 2,000 civilian deaths. It is imperative that in dealing with the elders, the negotiators must be strong and courageous, as these are values much appreciated in Afghanistan.
The future belongs to the elders in the tribes who will control the provinces. Many areas are isolated and have no communication or connection to tribes in neighbouring valleys and villages. In these places there have been no changes for centuries, nor will there be in the near future.
Despite all the best efforts of the Coalition forces, when they leave the country in 2014, conditions will return to much what they have always been except that there will be some pockets showing change; but far from any change that might create the kind of democracy envisioned in the romantic views of the Western intellectual elite.
Jason is to be congratulated for delivering a very telling and frank review of what has been troubling so many of us, with the casualties still being experienced as the war drags on, and with little evidence of nation-building able to be observed.